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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
THAYNE LARRY WALKER : Case No. 14322 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Burglary, a felony of 
the second degree, and Theft, a Class A misdemeanor, rendered by jury, 
in the Third District Court for the State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Thayne Larry Walker, was convicted by a jury 
of the crimes of Burglary and Theft on October 2, 1975, in the court 
of the Honorable Peter F. Leary, and was sentenced to serve the 
indeterminate term provided by law in the Utah State Prison, 
namely 1-15 years and one year concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of guilt entered against 
him and a new trial in this matter. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 2;25 p.m. on July 21, 1975, Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Deputy Mike Hanks was holding surveillance on an apartment 
complex located at 1840 West 6th North in Salt Lake City. From his 
position in a vacant house, he observed Defendants Thayne Walker 
and Robert Davis at the complex, but he lost sight of them when they 
went around in front of a building. (T.37) Hanks then entered his 
patrol car and proceeded to 6th North, hoping to relocate the 
defendants. Unable to relocate them, he returned to the apartment 
complex and held surveillance for another ten minutes. Hanks then 
proceeded to 4th North and was driving east toward Redwood Road when he 
saw the defendants in a Volkswagen van driven by Defendant Walker, in 
a driveway to an apartment complex at 1740 West 4th North. The van 
remained in the driveway while Hanks1 vehicle passed. Deputy Hanks 
waved to the defendants, and Defendant Davis, who knew Hanks, waved 
back. Deputy Hanks then pulled his vehicle off to the side of the 
road to allow the defendants to pass, but they instead pulled over and 
parked behind his patrol car. 
Deputy Hanks and Defendant Davis, the passenger, exited their 
respective vehicles and engaged in light conversation, with Davis stating 
that he had been visiting a friend in the apartment complex. (T.38) 
At this point Deputy Hanks instructed Davis to return to the Volkswagen 
and then asked Defendant Walker for his driver's license. Walker 
exited the van and produced a license. Hanks instructed him to remain 
in the van while he went back to the patrol car to check the license for 
revocations. Upon checking with the dispatcher, Deputy Hanks 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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determined there were no revocations and the license was valid. (T.39) 
Deputy Hanks then returned to the van and engaged in conversation with 
Defendant Walker. Hanks then returned to his patrol car and "radioed the 
city to send a city officer for assistance.11 (Transcript of 
Suppression Hearing, p. 11). Deputy Hanks testified that he made that 
request because he "wanted to check the apartment complex to see if there 
was a possible burglary there." (Id.) He also expressly stated that at 
this time he had not observed anything unusual about the van. (Id.) 
Hanks then returned to the van and asked Davis to step out. Davis 
did so and at this point Deputy Hanks observed some stereo equipment 
in the back of the van. At this time Defendant Davis remarked that 
"he didn't know anything about it (the stereo equipment) . . . " 
(T.39) 
The two continued to engage in small talk about Davisf girl friend 
until Hanks instructed Davis to return to the van. He then went to the 
patrol car and contacted the dispatcher to determine if the city officers 
were enroute when Officer Crokett and another Salt Lake City officer 
arrived. Hanks instructed them to watch the two defendants while he 
check the apartment complex from which the defendants had just come. 
He went to the apartment complex, went upstairs, and knocked 
on a door. Hanks asked the resident if he had seen two men in the 
apartment complex. The resident replied in the negative. (T. 41) 
Hanks then went downstairs and observed a partially opened door. The 
-3-
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door was approximately a foot and a half open and appeared to have 
been forced because the wood frame appeared to have been splintered. 
Looking inside, Hanks saw a lamp turned over and the interior of 
the apartment in disarray. (T. 42) 
Deputy Hanks returned upstairs and questioned the resident, with 
whom he had previously talked, concerning the occupants of the apartment 
below. He was informed that it belonged to the Talayumptuewas and 
that Mrs. Talayumptuewa worked at the Sears1 warehouse. Hanks then 
returned to the location of the vehicles and placed the defendants under 
arrest for the crime of burglary. He then requested the dispatcher 
to contact Mrs. Talayumptuewa and have her come to her apartment to 
determine if there were any missing items. 
Deputy Hanks then impounded the defendants1 vehicle by 
calling a commercial towing firm which transported the van to a 
secured location. When Mrs. Talayumptuewa arrived at her apartment, 
an inventory of the missing items was prepared. Deputy Hanks then went 
to the County Attorney's Office where a search warrant affidavit was 
prepared. A warrant to search the vehicle for the missing items was 
issued by a Salt Lake City Judge. 
Defendants Walker and Davis had been simultaneously taken to the 
county jail and were incarcerated on charges of burgLary and theft. 
Prior to executing the warrant for the search of the vehicle, 
Hanks contacted Mr. Talayumptuewa by telephone from the towing company's 
office. The vehicle was then searched and items of stereo equipment 
listed in the warrant were recovered from inside the van. In response 
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to the phone call, Hanks went to the apartment complex again and was 
given the broken tip of a screwdriver.(T. 44) 
At the trial the defendants moved to suppress introduction of 
the evidence (stereo equipment, tools, a piggy bank, and silver dollars) 
on the grounds that (1) it was fruit of an illegal arrest and (2) that 
the prosecution had introduced no search warrants to justify the searches 
that were made. These motions were denied and the evidence was 
admitted. The jury returned verdicts of guilty against both defendants 
and they were sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTIONS OF OFFICER HANKS CONSTITUTED A SEIZURE OF THE 
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT WALKER AND SUCH ACTIONS COME WITHIN 
THE PROTECTION OF FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
PROHIBITING UNREASONABLE SEIZURES. 
A. THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS A SEIZURE OF HIS 
PERSON, AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized; 
The Constitution of the State of Utah has an almost identical provision 
in Article I, Section 14. Inherent in these two documents imposing 
-5-
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Limitations upon government power is the concept of the right of the 
citizenry to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion. 
The State in the proceedings below has seemed to use the 
:erms "arrest11 and "detain" almost interchangeably, or at least in 
such a manner as to blur any distinction between the two. Perhaps 
:his is proper, in light of the constitutional implications involved in 
>oth terms. However, it is necessary to lay a foundation, in order to 
lake a distinction. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 20, L.Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 
[1968) the Supreme Court of the United States had an opportunity to 
ixamine a situation involving the detention of a suspect. That court 
itated: 
We, therefore, reject the notion that the Fourth Amendment 
does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police 
conduct if the officers stop short of something called a 
"technical arrest" or "full blown search." 392 U.S. at 19. 
In State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975) this :court recognized 
:hat provisions of both the State and Federal Constitutions are invoked 
n situations involving detentions. The Utah Court, favorably citing 
erry, supra, as holding that arrests without a warrant may only be made 
ipon probable cause, quoted from the Terry opinion: 
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment covers 'seizures1 
of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the 
station house and prosecution for crime -- 'arrests1 in 
traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever 
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized1 that person. 
541 P. 2d at 801. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has not been presented with any cases 
arising under the present "detention" statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§77-13-33 (1953); nevertheless, the almost exact similarity of the 
language of the Constitutional provisions involved and the fundamental 
policy reasons underlying such an interpretation should be reason 
enough to enable this court to hold, as in Terry, that "detentions" 
come within the scope of Constitutional protection. 
B. THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT BY DEPUTY HANKS EXCEEDED 
THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY STATUTE AND WAS THEREFORE AN 
ARREST. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-33 (1953), as amended, entitled "Authority 
of peace officer to stop and question suspect -- Grounds", provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place whom he 
has probable cause to believe: 
(1) is in the act of committing a crime; 
(2) has committed a crime; or 
(3) is attempting to commit a crime; 
and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of 
his actions. 
This section enacted in 1967 is a legislative act providing a peace 
officer "with authoirty to detain a suspect temporarily for questioning 
and search him for dangerous weapons." Section 77-13-34, which comprises 
the second section of the Act, grants the officer authority to conduct 
a search of the person for dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes 
he or any other person is in danger of life or limb. The defendant submits 
that this statute was enacted merely to grant the officer authority to 
make a limited detention of a person in a public place. It was designed 
for situations like that in Terry, supra, where an experienced officer 
had grounds to believe a crime was about to occur. In Terry the officer 
perceived very suspicious activity and made a limited detention for the 
purpose of determining the identity of the suspects. The search of the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
person, conducted for the officer's personal safety, was merely 
incident to that detention even though it produced the weapon, the 
carrying of which was a crime for which the suspect was later prosecuted. 
Had the officer been given a satisfactory explanation as to the suspect's 
activities so as to dispel his suspicions about them, and had the officer 
found no weapons during his limited search, he would have been obliged 
to release the individuals and allow them to proceed on their way. 
The intent of the Utah Statute is analogous. It allows the 
officer to "stop" and "demand" of an individual his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions, if he has a basis for any of the three 
statutory grounds. Upon receiving such, he is obliged to release the 
person at that time unless he has other grounds to hold him. 
It appears that the statute requires a higher standard, (i.e. "probable 
cause"), than is required by Terry, supra. 
Concerning this lesser standard, the Terry opinion stated: 
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional 
propriety of an investigative "seizure" upon less than 
probable cause for purposes of "detention" and/or interrogation. 
Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen 
and citizens involve "seizures" of persons. Only when the 
officer, by some means of physical force or show of authority, 
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we 
conclude that a "seizure" has occurred. 392 U.S. at 20. 
The first sentence of that paragraph would seem to indicate the U.S. 
Supreme Court is of the opinion that a "detention" may be based upon 
a showing of less than probable cause. That is certainly not the issue 
here because: (1) the relevant Utah statute authorizing detention 
specifically requires probable cause; (2) the State did not attempt to 
-8-
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justify the detention as flowing from a non-statutory authority to 
detain on less than probable cause; and (3) such a concept is clearly 
contradictory to the remainder of the language in the Terry opinion, 
as well as contradictory to provisions in both the U. S. and Utah 
constitutions requiring probable cause for seizures. 
As applied to the facts in this case, Deputy Hanks1 actions 
certainly constituted a "seizure" of the defendants. He had gone 
well beyond the scope of the detention authorized by Section 77-13-33. 
After he had obtained the defendant^1 names, addresses and an explanation 
of their actions he was obliged to release them. He was not authorized to 
request a back-up unit. He was not authorized to have Davis exit the 
vail a second time. These actions constituted an arrest. As per the 
Terry opinion, it certainly was a "seizure11 of the person because he had, 
by show of authority, restrained their liberty. The defendants knew that 
Deputy Hanks was conducting some kind of official investigation of them 
based upon his actions: checking the driver's license of Walker, calling 
for the back-up unit, (T. 62) and having Davis exit the vehicle. 
Certainly a reasonable person in this situation, upon observing the 
arrival of a second police unit and hearing Deputy Hanks1 instruction to 
the others to "watch these guys", would perceive he was not free to 
leave. If he were, there would be no need to instruct the city officers 
to "watch" the defendants. This cannot be construed to mean "follow them ai 
see where they go"; it means (implicit with Deputy Hanks1 actions), 
-9-
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4 
"I think these guys did something and I'm going to investigate." i 
A reasonable person would have believed he was in official custody 
at that time. There was even testimony that such detention by Deputy 
Hanks had occurred twice prior to this incident. (T. 134). Such I 
previous detentions by Officer Hanks, although clearly improper, 
were not the subject of any assertion of right to privacy or to be 
free from such an unreasonable search because at those instances 4 
such "detentions11 produced no criminal charges. 
At the trial, the prosecution attempted to rely on Utah Code 
Ann. §77-13-33 (1953),as amended, to authorize the arrest of the I 
defendants. However, that section was specifically enacted to allow 
police officers some authority to stop and detain suspected persons 
long enough to allow the officer to make inquiry into the person's i 
activities. The section cannot be construed to allow an unlimited 
detention so long as necessary for the officer to conduct an 
investigation of the area for possible criminal activities. Defendants i 
in the present case gave a reasonable explanation for their presence 
at the complex; they had been visiting a friend. The time of day was not 
unusual. Their conduct was not unusual. There was no possible reason i 
for the officer to continue to hold them any longer than was necessary 
to determine the reasons for their being in the area. Once he received 
their answer, which, on its fact,is satisfactory in light of all the i 
circumstances involved, the detention should have ceased. 
-10- i 
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Likewise inapplicable is any reliance the State may place upon 
the officer's authority to stop the vehicle under provision of Utah 
Code Ann. §41-l-17(c) (1953), as amended. Deputy Hanks, although he 
did check the driver's license of Walker, did not stop the vehicle 
for any operational violations. Moreover, Defendant Walker's license 
was in order, and free from any warrants or holds. 
C. THE DEFENDANT WALKER WAS PLACED UNDER ARREST AT THE TIME 
OF DEPUTY HANKS! RETURN FROM THE APARTMENT COMPLEX AND 
AT THAT TIME FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS ATTACHED. 
There was testimony by Deputy Hanks (T.42) that he placed the two 
defendants under arrest upon his return from the apartment complex. On 
cross-examination, Deputy Hanks explained his actions as that of 
searching the individuals, handcuffing them, and indicating to them they 
were under arrest for burglary. (T.63) Clearly, the State must 
concede that a seizure had occurred at that point. Such a seizure 
comes within the scope of the United States and State Constitutions 
(Terry, supra, p.6) and this court must determine whether the officer 
had probable cause for such arrest. 
POINT II. 
THE ARREST-AND SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT WAS WITHOUT 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND THEREFORE VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS UNDER 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §77-13-33 (1953), 
as amended. 
As previously noted, both the United States Constitution, and the 
Utah Constitution require "probable cause11 for the issuance of a warrant 
-11-
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( 
i 
to search or to seize. Although there is a judicial preference for the 
issuance of a warrant, the courts have realized that a warrant is not, 
per se, required for a seizure. However, if the intent of these 
Constitutional provisions is to be followed, the standard of probable 
cause ought to be the same for seizures which do not have judicial 
approval through a warrant. The concept of probable cause involves 
i 
more than just suspicion. There must be evidence which would "warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that a crime has been 
committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 at 162. A relaxation 
i 
Df this standard for probable cause would "leave law-abiding citizens 
at the mercy of the officerfs whim or caprice." Eringer v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948) at 176. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-33 (1953), as amended, discussed previously, 
provides authorization for an officer to stop a person in a public 
slace and demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his 
i 
actions when the officer "has reasonable cause to believe" he: 
(1) is in the act of committing a crime; 
(2) has committed a crime; or 
(3) is attempting to commit a crime. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-3 (1953), as amended, lists six grounds 
lpon which an officer may make an arrest without a warrant: 
(1) For a public offense committed in his presence. 
?his is obviously not involved in this case. 
-12-
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(2) When the person arrested has committed a felony, although 
not in his presence. 
Again, a situation which is not involved in the case at bar, 
(3) When he has reasonable cause for believing the person to 
have committed a public offense, although not in his presence. 
This subsection would appear to be the one the State uses to justify 
the arrest in this case. A discussion of this point follows this 
summary of the statute. 
(4) When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has 
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have 
committed it. 
This subsection cannot reasonably apply to this situation where the 
officer did not know the equipment in the van was stolen at all, let alone 
that it came from an apparently burglarized apartment. Furthermore, the 
officer had determined only that an apartment had been broken into, 
not that a theft had been committed, a fact essential to make the crime 
of burglary. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206 (1953), as amended, makes 
a person who unlawfully enters a building guilty of the crime of criminal 
trespass, a Class B misdemeanor. Therefore, this subsection is not 
applicable without the officerfs knowledge that a theft had been 
committed. 
(5) On a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of the 
commission of a felony by the person arrested. 
This subsection is not applicable because no other person made such a 
charge. 
i-,y 
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(6) At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe 
he has committed a felony. 
Since this was a daytime occurrence (2:30 p.m.) this subsection is 
clearly not applicable. .;> -
This indicates an anomaly in the Utah statutes. The legislature 
has given officers authority to "detain11 if they have probable cause 
but would permit the officer to arrest (77-13-3) upon what would appear 
to be the lower standard of "reasonable cause11. There may be no 
legal distinction between these two terms; but if there is, then it 
would seem that probable cause is the higher standard. Thus, the State 
may not rely on the authority of the detention statute to authorize 
a detention upon a lesser showing than that of probable cause. If 
any other interpretation is given to this statute, Defendant submits 
that enactment of Section 77-13-33, as it is presently written, would 
have been totally unnecessary because given the three statutory 
requirements for stopping the person and asking his name, etc., the 
officer could execute a "technical arrest" of the person. Surely he 
should need no authority to make a lesser intrusion upon the person's 
privacy and security if he merely desired to obtain his name, address, 
and an explanation of his actions. The statute (77-13-34) granting 
authority to search for weapons would likewise be unnecessary because 
a search for weapons could be made as incident to an arrest, but may 
be necessary for situations wherein the person is not arrested. 
At the time Deputy Hanks formulated the intent to detain the 
the defendants and took action to accomplish that end (i.e. requesting 
the dispatcher to send a city officer to his location to detain the 
defendants while he looked for a "possible burglary") he knew the 
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following facts: 
1. Defendant Walker and his companion had been in another part 
of town approximately ten minutes earlier; 
2. Defendant Davis was known to Deputy Hanks, but the driver 
of the vehicle, Defendant Walker, was unknown; 
3. Both defendants had a prior arrest; 
4. The vehicle had pulled out of an apartment complex; 
5. Defendant Davis waved to him in response to his wave; 
6. Defendant Walker pulled the bus to the curb behind the 
police car and Davis exited the vehicle and approached Deputy Hanks; 
7. The driver of the vehicle (Walker) had a valid drivers 
license; 
Surely these facts alone are insufficient to constitute "probable cause11 
for detention under Section 77-13-33. Even at the time Officer Crockett 
and his partner arrived at the scene and were instructed to "watch11 
the defendants while Hanks left and went looking for a "possible burglary," 
only four additional facts were known: 
1. Davis told him they had been visiting a friend in the apart-
ment complex; 
2. There was stereo equipment in the back of the van; 
3. The van was not registered to Defendant Davis; 
4. Davis, a passenger, made an unsolicited statement about 
his lack of knowledge concerning the stereo equipment in the van. 
These facts, in essence, constituted the total quantum of Deputy Hanks1 
knowledge concerning the defendants and their relationship to the 
stereo equipment, the van, and the apartment complex. Surely these 
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marginal facts cannot be construed to constitute ''probable cause11 
(required for detent ion under 77-13-33) or "reasonable cause11 
(required for arrest under 77-13-3(3). The most apparent reason 
for the non-existence of probable cause is that the officer had no 
knowledge a crime had been committed, much less that it had been 
committed by the defendant. Reliance by the State upon Draper 
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959) allowing detention 
if the officer can articulate "specific facts",. is misapplied in 
this case because here all the specific facts are "outwardly innocent"; 
Henry v. U.S., 361 U.S. 98 at 103 (1959); in Draper the acts were 
certainly suspicious. 
In State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969), this 
Jourt defined the requirement for probable cause for a warrantless 
arrest in accordance with Section 77-13-3(3) by saying: 
The requirement, as in so many areas of law, is one of 
reason, that it may be shown under the facts and 
circumstances known to the officer, a reasonable and 
prudent man in his position would be justified in 
believing the suspect had committed the offense. 
451 P.2d at 775. 
The quoted sentence has a footnote referring to the early United States 
Jupreme Court case of Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878) where the 
concept of probable cause was considered. The Stacey opinion contains 
:wo definitions from earlier cases as to what constitutes probable 
tause. The first is by Mr. Justice Washington: 
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(a) reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances 
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man 
in the belief that the party is guilty of the offense of which 
he is charged. 97 U.S. at 645. 
Even when the seizure ("full blown arrest") occurred upon Hanks1 
return to the place where the defendants were waiting, the officer 
only knew two additional facts: 
1. That an apartment was apparently benn broken into; and 
2. That the resident upstairs did not see or hear anything. 
It is significant to point out what Officer Hanks did not know at that 
time. He did not know if any stereo equipment had been stolen. Thus, 
the remark made by Davis about such equipment and its actual 
physical presence inside the van could have no basis for probable 
cause to seize (arrest) the defendant for theft of stereo equipment. 
Davis was merely a passenger in a vehicle being driven by another. 
Such lack of knowledge on his part is entirely logical and thus the 
remark cannot be construed to constitute probable cause. 
The State relied upon the case of State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 
2d 124, 499 P.2d 276 (1972) in an attempt to justify the arrest in 
the case at bar. In that case, a Nephi policeman had seen car lights 
flash on in the Nebo Medical Center parking lot at 3 a.m. He then saw 
the car leaving the parking lot. He stopped the car and after he had 
made a brief investigation as to the occupants' identities, he allowed the 
car to proceed. The officer then returned to the clinic and upon 
investigation, observed a broken window and a door open at the clinic. 
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e radioed ahead to other units to have the auto stopped and the 
ccupants arrested. In Eastmond, this court found that the officer had 
robable cause. However,: Defendant submits that the case is
 { 
efficiently different from the case at bar in several key issues 
slevant to a finding of probable cause: 
1. The lateness of the hour (3a.m.); • " " 
2. The location, which would not normally have teen-age 
Lsitors at that late hour; 
3. The officer saw the lights "flash on" and the car drive 
my from the clinic, meaning the lights were lfoff" before he 
>served the car, most likely to avoid detection; 
4. The officer observed, in plain view, items inherently
 { 
ispicious:" a small ffdoctorfs bagM and some small bottles of alcohol. 
lese facts, taken together, may have been enough at that point to 
mstitute probable cause to arrest, but the officer did not detain the
 { 
idividuals any longer; after being told their "explanation11 of their 
:tions he allowed the vehicle to proceed. Only after he had determined 
iat an offense (a burglary) had apparently been committed did he < 
tdio ahead and effect the arrest of the occupants. 
That action should be contrasted with the present case where: 
1. There was a lawful, and not unreasonable or unusual, ', 
:planation as to the defendants' presence in the apartment complex 
irking lot; 
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2. A not unusual hour (2:30 in the afternoon) was involved; 
3. The officer saw no items of identifiable contraband or 
even items which might arouse a suspicion that it was contraband. 
Certainly many more young men carry stereo equipment in their automo-
biles than carry "doctor's bags11. Deputy Hanks was unaware of any 
offense being committed; yet he (unlike the officer in the Eastmond 
case) seized the defendants and then went looking for probable 
cause. 
The plain view doctrine cannot be relied upon to justify the 
seizure of the stereo equipment because that doctrine is only applicable 
to items which the officer has probable cause to believe are contraband 
of some nature. 
People v. Miller, 7 Ca. 3d 219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr. 
860 (1972), involved an arrest for an outstanding traffic warrant. 
At the time of the arrest (3 a.m.) the police noticed electronic 
musical equipment in the back of the defendant's van. On appeal for 
a conviction of possession of marijuana the state attempted to show there 
were sufficient grounds to arrest the defendant for burglary, thereby 
allowing a more extensive search of the defendant and his vehicle 
than could otherwise be made. The Supreme Court of California responded 
to this assertion as follows: 
. . . the additional fact that he happened to be carrying 
electronic equipment at that time, would not, in itself, 
support an inference that the equipment had been stolen, 
particularly since the police had not received any report of the 
theft of such material. (Emphasis added) 496 P.2d at 1232. 
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uch analysis is especially relevant to the present case where the 
olice (Deputy Hanks) had received no report of any burglary at the 
ime of the initial seizure and, even later, when he suspected a burglary
 { 
ad taken place, he still did not know there had been a theft of stereo 
luipment. In fact, at the time he initially decided to detain the 
sfendants, Hanks did not even know they were carrying the stereo
 4 
juipment. He only knew they were exiting the parking lot of an 
>artment complex. 
In Remers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 2 Cal. 3d
 ( 
>9, 470 P.2d 11, 87 Cal. Rptr. 202, (1970), the California Supreme 
>urt granted a defendant's petition for a Writ of Mandamus to compel 
ippression of evidence. The court there held that the officers did I 
»t have probable cause to arrest the defendant when they saw her reach 
tto her purse and withdraw a tinfoil wrapped packet which she 
ansferred to another person, who then passed to her what appeared to 4 
money. The court felt that such activity was by itself innocent 
d would not constitute probable cause to arrest the individuals 
r drug trafficking. Likewise, it cannot be said that merely carrying 4 
ereo equipment in the back of a van constitutes probable cause, 
rtainly more people carry items in trucks than pass small packages 
tin-foil in exchange for money. All such people should not be subject 4 
arrest because the property in such vans might be stolen. The 
ners court continued: 
i 
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Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity 
as with the criminal activity, a detention based on those 
events is unlawful (cases cited); a fortiori, an arrest 
and search based on these events is unlawful. 
470 P.2d at 13. 
The State attempts to elevate Deputy Hanks1 simple suspicion 
to the level of probable cause by relying on the knowledge of Officer 
Hanks that Defendant Davis had a criminal record. Such a basis for 
probable cause is not listed in the statutory grounds for arrest. 
In Remers, supra, the California court stated: 
We have held that a prior related conviction, when known by 
the arresting officers, has Mat best only a slight tendency" 
to establish a present violation of the law . . . 470 P.2d at 16. 
Applied to the facts of the present case, it is apparent Deputy Hanks 
had no probable cause to detain or arrest the defendant. All he knew 
of was the defendant's previous arrest record. Such .knowledge cannot 
be elevated to the level of probable cause, for to do so would be to 
relegate an arrested person to the status of second class citizen. 
Specifically, the Defendant Davis would never in his life be allowed 
to transport in a vehicle any item which might be stolen, because any 
officer who knew he had the prior burglary arrest would be allowed 
to arrest him. Any item he would have might be stolen, thus he is 
precluded from carrying any sizeable personal property, so as to 
avoid arrest. And it doesn't matter that the officer does not know 
if a theft has been committed; he can merely "hold" the suspect (that 
is, "have him watched") while he goes out looking for an apparent 
burglary and theft; and if he determines there might have been a theft 
or a burglary in the area, then he can arrest that person, even when 
he doesn't know what was taken. The defendant submits that this situation 
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< 
s the very evil the framers of the United States and State Constitutions i 
>resaw and sought to prevent. Moreover, the defendant Walker was 
)t even known to the officer. Certainly the mere fact of a prior 
lowledge of the defendant Davis* background could not add to 4 
robable cause for the detention and arrest of Walker. 
Remers was followed in People v. Ware, 484 P.2d 103 (Colo. 1971). 
Le defendant had voluntarily appeared at the police station to assist I 
friend under arrest for theft. An Officer Bates learned from a 
puty Schaefer that the defendant had been involved with narcotics, 
id information originating from a confidential informant. Bates I 
ticed in the defendants pocket an aluminum foil package, and a 
arch presuming a relationship to narcotics was upheld by the trial 
urt. On appeal, the higher court cited Remers, and held that since 4 
ny legal substances were wrapped in aluminum foil, probable cause 
s not established because the conduct was as likely innocent as 
ilty. (Id. at 105). « 
In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), federal officers 
served one Pierotti, about whom they had received information concerning 
sft from interstate shipments, removing cartons from a residence and 4 
ading them into his car. The agents took him into custody and seized 
3 cartons. It was not until two hours later, after the suspect 
I been arrested and taken to the federal offices, that the agents I 
irned the cartons contained stolen radios, not liquors as they had 
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suspected. In Henry the prosecution had conceded that the arrest occurr 
when the officers stopped the automobile. The United States Supreme 
Court said: f•'•"; 
When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their 
liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was 
complete. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether 
at or before that time they had reasonable cause to believe 
that a crime had been committed. The fact that afterwards 
contraband was discovered is not enough. An arrest is not 
justified by what the subsequent search discloses. (Emphasis 
added). 361 U.S. at 103. 
Concerning the issue of probable cause for the arrest, the Court 
continued: 
On the record there was far from enough evidence against him 
to justify a magistrate in issuing a warrant . . . Riding 
in the car, stopping in an alley, peicking up packages, 
driving away these acts were all acts that were outwardly 
innocent. 361 U.S. at 103. 
Certainly it must be conceded that Defendant Walker's activity 
in leaving the apartment complex with the stereo equipment in the van 
at 2:30 irf the afternoon was "outwardly innocent" and thus is not 
sufficient to constitute probable cause. 
The Court in Henry, supra, at 104, stated that "(t)he police 
must have reasonable grounds to believe the stereo equipment in the 
van was contraband." Since he had received no report of any stereo 
equipment stolen in that area, Deputy Hanks' conclusion was merely 
conjecture. As in Henry, the police did not determine the stereo equipm 
was stolen until some hours later, when the Talayuemptuewas had inventor 
ied their loss and the van had been serached all subsequent to the 
arrest and incarceration of the defendants. 
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< 
I 
The Henry opinion continues: 
The fact that the suspects were in an automobile is not enough. 
Carroll v. United States, supra, liberalized the rule governing 
searches when a moving vehicle is involved. But that decision ^ 
merely relaxed the requirement for a warrant on the grounds 
of practicality. It did not dispense with the need for 
probable cause. 361 U.S. at 104. 
Mr. Justice Douglas summed up the entire impact of the court's 
>lding in Henry: 
To repeat, an arrest is not justified by what the subsequent 
search discloses. Under our system, suspicion is not enough 
for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is better, so 
the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty sometimes go ' 
free than the citizens be subject to easy arrest. 
361 U.S. at 104. 
Finally, this court has enhanced the principle that "fishing 
peditions" are not justified by the results. In State v. Criscola ^ 
Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968), this court upheld a conviction 
ere the defendant was stopped driving a stolen car without a valid 
ivers license. The court, having grounds for finding probable * 
use in the case, did state: 
. . . we acknowledge our agreement generally with the 
proposition that a peace officer may not, without 
justifiable excuse, stop a citizen and conduct a fishing * 
expedition search of the automobile for evidence of crime. 
Id. at 519. 
Like the Criscola situation, defendant Walker was violating no traffic 
*s, and an impound search incident to a traffic arrest was not ' 
solved. 
-24-
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POINT III 
ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE VEHICLE PURSUANT TO A SEARCH 
WARRANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THAT SEARCH WARRANT WAS 
TAINTED BY THE UNLAWFUL ARREST. 
Deputy Hanks testified that after arresting the defendants he 
caused their vehicle to be impounded. He then obtained a search 
warrant to search the vehicle for the items listed by Mrs. Talayumpteuwa 
as being missing from her apartment. Over objections of the Defendant 
Davis and Defendant Walker, these items were introduced into evidence 
at trial. The defendant contends that such admission was improper 
because the items were "fruit of the poisonous tree'1. 
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is an established 
principle of criminal and constitutional law. In Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963), the United 
States Supreme Court suppressed narcotics evidence obtained as the result 
of an illegal arrest and subsequent confession. The standard enunciated 
was that the evidence would not have come to light but for the illegal 
actions of the police. This principle has been followed by the 
Utah Supreme Court. See State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d 
422 (1971). 
The exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is 
where the obtaining of the evidence is so remote from the illegality 
that it has become attenuated and the taint is no longer present. The 
defendant contends such is not the present case. The evidence was 
obtained directly as a result of the unlawful arrest, albeit pursuant 
to a search warrant. The search warrant was not produced at the trial, 
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Ln spite of defendants "poisonous tree fruit1' objections to the 
Introduction of the evidence. Thus, there was no finding that the 
warrant had overcome the "poisonous taint" of the primary illegality 
>f the initial unlawful arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
This court is herein presented with an excellent issue for 
lefining a "fishing expedition" search and arrest. The overreaching 
»f Deputy Hanks in the detention and search of defendants would prove 
uccessfull in only a small number of cases. In all others the rights 
f private citizens would prove to be forfeit. 
The improper introduction of evidence against the defendant 
ubstantially prejudiced his right to receive a fair trial and thus 
e should be entitled to reversal of his conviction and another trial 
t which the unlawfully obtained evidence is excluded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIAN A. WHITE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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